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I am grateful to the editor of JITTA for
the opportunity to append a brief response to
Cathy Urquhart’s article (Urquhart 2002); I
am also pleased that Dr Urquhart has taken the
trouble to reply to my earlier piece, and so
develop the debate on GTM.
In many regards we are in agreement;
we both wish to stress the usefulness of the
method, we both understand that the early
formulations may now need to be revised or
reinterpreted, and we are both concerned that
the philosophical underpinnings of the method
be clarified.
In other respects our views diverge, and
some of the differences are important. I think
that Urquhart is too accommodating to
positivism in general, and consequently to the
positivist inclinations of GTM. She states that
‘GTM is paradoxical and unique’ in its claims
to be a systematic way of generating theory
from qualitative data.
Unless I have
misinterpreted her entirely, the unstated
corollaries of this sentiment are that systematic
theory generation is primarily associated with
quantitative data, and that all non-GTM ways
of generating theory from qualitative data are
unsystematic – otherwise GTM would not be
unique. I would dispute these ideas, and
perhaps when stated so bluntly, Urquhart
would as well.

That Urquhart expresses herself in this
manner, indicates that she is prepared to offer
credence to a scientistic or positivist
orientation; and this then explains her
arguments regarding data and induction:
Which are where we diverge most sharply. I
do not understand why she thinks that
induction is not intimately associated with
positivism. She states that GTM is ‘above all
… an inductive method … yet it is seen as a
post positivist1 method’. The concept of
phenomenalism is central to Kolakowski’s
characterization of positivism, and Giddens
(1974) specifically uses the term in
Kolakowski’s sense.
As such positivism
centers around phenomenalism, which implies
induction; and classic GTM is unerringly
inductive.
I must admit that Urquhart’s discussion
of phenomenalism seemed confused, until I
realized that the fault was mine in mentioning
Haig’s (1995) work. Haig’s vain effort to
rescue GTM from positivism introduces the
distinction between data and phenomena – but
the latter is used in a rather haphazard fashion
and certainly does not equate to
phenomenalism as used by Giddens (1974). In
many ways, I rather wish that I had not
1

Post-positivist is a misleading term since it really
refers to attempts to rescue positivism from its
critiques; as such it is still positivism, but perhaps in
a new guise – i.e. neo-positivism.
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mentioned Haig at all. My main motivation in
referencing his article was that he is one of the
few people writing about GTM who tries to
take issue with what Urquhart terms the
‘philosophical baggage’. He recognizes that
the simple use of induction that underlies
‘classic’ GTM will not stand any close
scrutiny – hence his accusation of ‘naïve
Baconian inductivism‘ (not inductionism as
Urquhart states it).
Haig’s solution is to introduce the term
phenomena and distinguish it from the term
data. His argument is not convincing and
neither is it sustained, as I explain in my
article. It is, however, indicative of the real
nub of the problem which is the term data.
The quotes I offer in my original article, taken
from a range of writing by both Glaser and
Strauss (Glaser 1978, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999,
2002a, 2002b, Glaser and Strauss 1967,
Strauss 1987, Strauss and Corbin 1989, 1990,
1994), indicate that the concept of data is both
central to the method – theory emerging from
the data – but ultimately ill-defined and
unexamined. Urquhart tries to defend GTM
from a simplistic view of data, arguing that
coding somehow transforms data into
something else – categories; but this is
unpersuasive, as it still begs the question how
the categories are formed, and in what sense is
the data transformed rather than merely
categorized? Urquhart feels she can go some
way to answer this by saying that the process
of coding is ‘subjective’ ; but it is not clear
what she achieves by defining it in this way.
She seems to be undermining her earlier claim
that GTM is systematic, since some
interpretations of the term ‘subjective’ would

resonate with concepts such as personalized,
idiosyncratic and diverse.
The reason she gets rather tangled in
her own argument is that she is unwilling to let
go of the GTM mantra of theory being
‘grounded in the data’. Anyone making this
sort of claim has to grapple with critiques of
positivism and also point out how to overcome
issues such as the Quine-Duhem thesis of
underdetermination; i.e. that a theory is never
fully determined by the facts, or data.
GTM as stated by Glaser & Strauss
cannot engage with these sorts of
philosophical issues without emerging in a
different form. That was the point of my
original article, and Urquhart seems to be
heading in this direction when observing that
GTM is essentially concerned with meaning
construction. Ultimately, however, she does
not develop this point. Were she to do so her
conclusions would be far closer to mine, and
also to those of Charmaz in her contribution to
the 2nd edition of the Handbook of Qualitative
Research. Charmaz (2000) articulates the idea
of constructivist GTM, contrasting it to
objectivist GTM. Glaser (2002) has responded
directly to Charmaz, and I leave to the reader
to decide who has the more coherent set of
ideas.
In conclusion I welcome Urquhart’s
contribution as part of a continuing process of
developing the method beyond its origins, and
making it a key feature of IS research. The
question posed by Urquhart in the title of her
reply must be answered by ‘yes’ to the first
part, and ‘no’ to the second – Cathy Urquhart
and I concur on that.
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